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PORTER, Circuit Judge. 
Sandra Clowney appeals the District Court’s order granting summary judgment to 
her employer and union. Clowney claims that her employer, AECOM and URS Federal 
Services, Inc. (“URS”), violated its collective-bargaining agreement by not rehiring her 
after a company-wide layoff. She also claims that the union1 violated its duty of fair 
representation by (1) not pursuing her claim against URS, and (2) not including her in a 
settlement involving a different layoff. The record does not support her claims. The 
District Court properly granted summary judgment for the company and the union. 
I2 
We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts of this case and the issues for 
review. We review the District Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Podobnik v. 
U.S. Postal Serv., 409 F.3d 584, 589 (3d Cir. 2005). “[S]ummary judgment is appropriate 
only where the parties have established that there is no genuine dispute of material fact 
and are ‘entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). We 
“view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,” and we “make all 
reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Id. 
II 
Clowney sued URS for breach of a collective-bargaining agreement under 
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 185. Typically, an 
 
1 The union consists of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace 
Workers, District Lodge 1, and Local 1717. 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 185. See Hines v. Anchor Motor 





employee must exhaust the collective-bargaining agreement’s arbitration procedures 
before suing in federal court. DelCostello v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 
151, 163 (1983). But when an employee claims wrongdoing by the union itself, she can 
bring a “hybrid” suit against both the employer and the union. Id. at 164. We treat such 
suits as two separate causes of action: the claim against the employer rests on Section 301 
for breach of the collective-bargaining agreement, and the claim against the union is 
implied under the National Labor Relations Act for breach of the union’s duty of fair 
representation. Id. To recover, Clowney must prevail on both claims. See id. at 165. 
A union breaches its duty of fair representation only when its conduct toward one 
of its members is “arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.” Riley v. Letter Carriers 
Local No. 380, 668 F.2d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 1981) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967)). When an employee files a grievance 
against an employer, “a union may not arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or 
process it in perfunctory fashion.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Vaca, 
386 U.S. at 191). “Perfunctory” means something more than “[m]ere ineptitude or 
negligence,” and “[t]he fact that trained counsel would have avoided the error or pursued 
a different strategy is not enough.” Id. The employee must show “actual bad faith or 
arbitrary conduct,” id., and cannot rely on “bare assertions,” Masy v. N.J. Transit Rail 
Operations, Inc., 790 F.2d 322, 328 (3d Cir. 1986). 
Clowney makes two arguments in support of her claim that the union breached its 
duty of fair representation. First, she says the union did not fairly represent her when it 





filed the grievance on her behalf. Second, she argues that the union did not fairly 
represent her when it excluded her from a labor settlement. Both arguments fail. 
A 
Clowney first argues that the union unfairly represented her in her grievance 
against URS. Her underlying grievance is that URS breached the collective-bargaining 
agreement by not recalling her as an equipment cleaner following a company-wide layoff 
in April 2013. She claims that the union breached its duty of fair representation by 
unreasonably demanding evidence of her former position as an equipment cleaner. We 
disagree. 
Clowney has not shown that the union exhibited “actual bad faith or arbitrary 
conduct.” Riley, 668 F.2d at 228. She worked as an equipment cleaner for Lockheed 
Martin, then as an ET-2 and ET-3 for Defense Services, and finally as an ET-3 for URS. 
It is not obvious that URS would know of Clowney’s prior work as an equipment cleaner 
for Lockheed Martin. The record contains only one document showing that URS could 
have known of her prior work: a January 2012 form that Clowney herself filled out. 
Because of the limited evidence, the union requested that Clowney produce some proof 
of her former work as an equipment cleaner. She could not, and still has not. If “[t]he fact 
that trained counsel would have avoided the error or pursued a different strategy is not 
enough,” much less is a request for evidence supporting a key fact of Clowney’s 
grievance. Id. Clowney’s inability to produce the requested evidence does not mean the 





anyway. Thus, “there is nothing to indicate that the Union has ignored [her] grievances 
because of bad faith.” Masy, 790 F.2d at 328. 
B 
Clowney’s second argument is that the union unfairly represented her by failing to 
include her in an arbitration settlement. The arbitration concerned reassignment of ET-2s 
involved in a September 2012 layoff. Under the collective-bargaining agreement, URS 
could require testing for employees trying to bump into the ET-2 cable-shop position, but 
it could not require testing for employees being reassigned to that position. URS had 
inappropriately required testing of the reassigned ET-2s, which led to the settlement 
agreement. Clowney was trying to bump (not reassign) into the ET-2 cabling position, so 
URS could properly require that she pass a cabling test. Clowney thus lacks direct 
evidence that she was unfairly excluded from the settlement. 
Absent direct evidence, Clowney urges us to infer that she was unfairly excluded 
by pointing to other employees who were allegedly similarly situated to herself but were 
included in the settlement. This argument is also without merit. All the affidavits 
Clowney submitted are from employees who were ET-2s at the time of the September 
2012 layoff, not ET-3s. Clowney was neither a part of the 2012 layoffs, nor was she an 
ET-2 at the time of her layoff in 2013. She was not similarly situated as the other 
employees included in the settlement.  
Clowney points to one employee who was laid off with her in 2013 as an ET-3 and 
was included in the settlement. However, she has adduced no evidence showing that this 





evidence of anyone who was included in the settlement agreement who should not have 
been. Without that evidence, we cannot infer that Clowney was unfairly excluded from 
the settlement agreement. Clowney must show that the union demonstrated “actual bad 
faith or arbitrary conduct” in excluding her from the settlement. Riley, 668 F.2d at 228. 
She has shown neither, so her fair-representation claim fails. 
* * * 
Clowney argues that her union breached its duty of fair representation by not 
standing up for her in a grievance proceeding and by excluding her from an arbitration 
settlement. She lacks sufficient evidence supporting her claims. Finding no dispute of 
material fact, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment.3 
 
3 Judge McKee does not think that summary judgment was appropriate because he 
believes there are genuine issues of material fact. He believes that Clowney identified at 
least one employee, Keith Labaty, who was similarly situated to Clowney and was 
included in a settlement Clowney was excluded from. He also believes there are 
sufficient questions surrounding URS’s handling of Michael Fink to survive summary 
judgment. Facts surrounding Fink were not disputed. 
